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Joint intelligence doctrine is stuck in a rut, and can't get out. The rut is not caused by technology failures, or collection management gaps, or insufficient training.
The rut is caused by how U.S. military officers are educated to look at warfighting. The basic presuppositions-the metacognitive aspect of intelligence support-need to change.
In the "clash of cultures" where U.S. officers often find themselves, they pit their materialistic, risk-averse, technologically oriented military against threats that are the opposite in every measure that matters. Fortunately, American culture accepts that the only constant is change, so there is hope that it can make the needed transformation. But unless it finds a new way of looking at intelligence support, it will find itself surprised again on another 9/11. Joint doctrine does not contain a framework for thinking about intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) that is useful to the coalition commander fighting an asymmetric or unconventional threat. Consequently, U.S. Services do not develop or reward "the human in the loop," and little value is placed on the human factors in intelligence.
Glaring examples have surfaced over the last two years as the United States prosecutes a global war on terrorism. While substantive solutions will take a long time and require a culture change, some things can be done in the short term.
U.S. fixation on technology as the context of intelligence, rather than as just one aspect of the content of intelligence, inhibits it from thinking like its enemies. That is particularly true when they are culturally distinct from Americans as are the current adversaries-be they African warlords, Middle East despots, Islamic extremists, or South American narco-trafficers. The failure to fully appreciate how different peoples think, as a valid intelligence requirement in its own right, leads U.S. forces to devalue the human in the intelligence cycle. A further consequence of inadequacies in human intelligence or HUMINT is that when operating in an ad-hoc coalition of nations, U.S. forces are unable to adequately support them with the products of what is referred to as the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, or IPB. U.S. forces need to overcome their bias in favor of the technical and the rational, so that they can become better able to predict and counter today's asymmetric enemy with the ad-hoc coalitions in which they must fight.
Joint force leaders need to be able to think like the enemy, without fighting like it does. U.S. forces fight today multiple and ill-defined enemies, both national and transnational, all of which share a common belief in unrestricted warfare. To U.S. enemies, the ends justify the means. That empowers them to think unconventionally and idiosyncratically as naturally as they breathe, and U.S. forces are blind. 1 They are unable to meet the first objective of intelligence in support of joint operations, which is to understand the enemy's objectives and predict its future courses of action. 2 Joint Pub (JP) 3-07, Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), suggests that an understanding of both adversaries and allies is necessary, but at a level much deeper than just the quantifiable data that sensors and systems can pick up. Furthermore,
it suggests that such understanding should be sufficient to allow joint force leaders to visualize the world as their enemies do. "It is only through understanding of the values by which people define themselves, that an intervener can establish for himself a perception of legitimacy and assure that actions intended to be coercive, do in fact have the intended effect." 3 American cultural conceits and shortfalls in U.S. education keep Ameri-
cans from operationalizing what has long been identified as important: that one needs to understand the values of one's enemies (taken here to mean the whole suite of attributes that make up a culture and its fundamental presuppositions). Failure to attend to this systemic flaw in the approach to intelligence will cripple American forces. Humans need to stay in the loop for reasons ranging from the need to manually sift through pertinent information to actually conducting the collection. The increasing popularity of human intelligence (HUMINT) is shallow, for HUMINT is misunderstood and poorly supported. Indeed HUMINT is truly stuck in a rut, and not one of its own making. The first step to improvement is understanding.
Consider the commonly accepted but mistaken notion that a computer can sort information to produce intelligence. It is true that one can get a computer to sort just about anything digital, but anyone who has tried to search on-line for something simple, only to be given mounds of unasked-for information, understands intuitively that computers can't think. For the analyst, the experience is the same. Analysts use computer search engines for data mining, which is then used to draw relationships for prediction. Their success in that endeavor depends entirely on how well the information was tagged and indexed when it was digitized. One can only guess how often analysts have failed to connect the dots for want of information that had not been tagged. As with all technology, it is still the human who must intuit complex relationships, put reason behind why things occur, establish trends, and make predictions. Reason and intuition are human factors, which cannot be separated from the intelligence equation.
Reliance on computers means that information that is not tagged is not seen. It is information that for all intents and purposes disappears. Tagging involves billions of related bits of information, which only humans can load. However, as mentioned earlier there are billions and billions of bits of information, and information overload becomes a
problem.
An example from recent operations in Afghanistan is from a tactical HUMINT unit conducting document exploitation. At first they had just a few drawings, letters, and manuals. These documents were translated and the information passed along, which significantly affected the IPB. Almost immediately, this small HUMINT unit became a clearinghouse for documents that soon filled a 1,500-square-foot room from ceiling to floor, overwhelming its capacity. Thus the information it was given was essentially useless. When multiplied across the entire intelligence community, the magnitude of the problem becomes clear.
One can find objects on the ground through Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). If people are talking about the objects on the ground, U.S forces can intercept the conversation through Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). However, when objects can't be found and people aren't talking, HUMINT must fill in the who, what, where, when, why, and how.
In the global war on terrorism HUMINT has become the "INT" of choice, and joint force commanders are attempting to enable their HUMINT mechanisms. However, most do not understand HUMINT.
When most people think of HUMINT they think "cloak and dagger," but it is much more than spy work. Anything that requires a human to deal with another human to get information is HUMINT. In fact, clandestine HUMINT contributes only a small percentage of all HUMINT gathered. The most common HUMINT collectors are interrogators, strategic debriefers, attaches, and clandestine officers.
Interrogators are very effective at gleaning pertinent information from hostile individuals in a timely manner. The problem is that there are simply not enough of them.
As U.S forces prosecute the war on terrorism, they are gathering more people needing interrogation than there are interrogators. 16 The nation can produce more interrogators, but it is a time consuming process to develop the necessary experience. Interrogation is a tricky business, and the only way to learn it is by doing it. The interrogator must learn to apply the maximum psychological pressure while ensuring that the person interrogated does not become so confused or frightened that he gives erroneous information. 17 An interrogator must also identify and understand the legal category of the subject, as well as the subject's specific rights according to that category. Interrogated groups are typically divided into detainees and prisoners of war (POWs). One is a bit freer to conduct an interrogation against a detainee than against a POW. One action being taken to forestall the shortage of interrogators is training strategic debriefers as interrogators.
Strategic debriefers are trained to gather all essential elements of information (EEI) from individuals who have access to information and are willing participants. They are neither interrogators nor clandestine officers, but something in the middle. Unfortunately the shortage of interrogators is closely followed by a shortage of strategic debriefers. And that shortage leads to untrained individuals attempting to serve as strategic debriefers. When untrained individuals attempt a strategic debrief, they inevitably miss information slipped casually into the conversation. The strategic debriefer is specifically trained to squeeze every drop of information out of willing participants. Typically, there is only one opportunity to talk to the willing participants (for a variety of reasons, not least of which could be the participants' safety), and an untrained debriefer who misses something most likely will not get a second chance. Unrecovered information is information that might as well not exist. The solution is to cross train each specialty-that is, train all interrogators as strategic debriefers, and vice versa. To enable HUMINT, change must start in Congress, which can repeal the laws that constrain HUMINT and provide more resources, specifically more HUMINT operators. While Congress soaks up airtime, and the press points fingers at the CIA and DOD entities for their lack of HUMINT, the truth is that the lack of HUMINT starts and ends with Congress. It changed the laws, and legislators were the ones who cut back HU-MINT to a state of impotency. 19 The translation of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (JIPB) from U.S. intelligence gathering systems to the joint/coalition decision-makers must be refo-cused. As a result of both regulations and bureaucratic structure, the military has been forced to mask or isolate the full intelligence-gathering capabilities from coalition decision-makers.
During the Cold War, the United States depended on firm allies with whom it had developed long-standing trust and with whom it shared a common threat, as well as a common basis of cultural and environmental concerns. At issue now is the fact that the fidelity and capability of current U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
systems' finished products have become so classified. At the same time, the nature of U.S. coalition partners has become so problematic that sharing meaningful intelligence with them has become nearly impossible. Nonetheless, coalition partners are essential, and they must be supported by both U.S. ISR and analysis. Despite the temporary nature of today's coalitions, the coalition imperative endures. This presents a problem, as U.S.
ISR systems tend to focus on the elements of JIPB that the United States finds important, often at the expense of some elements that its coalition partners find important to them. Unfortunately, there is potential that such a funneling effect will have a very negative impact. JP 2-0 also states that "intelligence personnel and organizations are responsible for supporting the users as they integrate the intelligence into their decision making and planning process." 23 In the more predictable past, intelligence capabilities were shared and classification release of ISR data extended through releasability agreements known as standardization agreements (STANAGs). To obtain such release authority, the U.S. commander in an alliance could rely on the National Disclosure Policy 1 (NDP 1) as the U.S. release authority for ISR data. But operations today call for quick alliances with coalition partners not already included on any STANAGs or in NDP 1. Often, intelligence information is fleeting and requires immediate dissemination to coalition decision-makers. "Dumbing
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down ISR products" in order to disseminate them to coalition decision-makers is counterproductive to successful campaign execution and decision-making.
Currently, coalition partners are added to STANAGs, and the JIPB information working its way down the funnel is considered both on its necessity to the coalition's JIPB needs (as the U.S. forces see it), as well as on the information's releasability to coalition partners. The goal of JIPB is to get useful information to all users in the decisionmaking phase without having to yield or relent to the more powerful county's intentions.
Therefore, the objective should be to reduce the JIPB and ISR information lost in the funneling effect due to releasability issues.
U.S. intelligence officers tend to focus on U.S.-centric JIPB issues, often done without regard to the elements of JIPB of concern to coalition partners. The product is built, classified, and packaged in a U.S.-centric product for U.S. decision makers.
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An example would be the rather embarrassing bombing of the Chinese Embassy during Operation ALLIED FORCE. The United States (for reasons outside the scope of this paper), had decided to operate a "U.S. only ATO" comprising U.S. assets, employed via their own targeting and planning methods, outside the NATO combined air operations center (CAOC). Targets and ISR products-in fact the entire ATO production and exe-cution-was held at a "U.S. only" security level thus working outside the funnel of the rest of NATO's intelligence operation. Target photos were developed and targets sometimes selected by a small cell within the CIA, without the NATO J-2 overview. Because of that sense of secrecy, it was never noticed that what the CIA had chosen as a "warehouse that was headquarters of Yugoslav Army procurement" was in fact the Chinese Embassy. 24 This "nonreleasability" set up the United States to inaccurately prepare the battlefield, and that in turn resulted in a tragic and strategically embarrassing accident.
The rest of the NATO coalition was left "holding the bag" for a target that it had never been cleared to look at. Had this entire process been allowed to be viewed by the NATO J-2 targeting cell instead of a "U.S. only" targeting cell in the CIA or Langley, perhaps the mistake would have been highlighted and the embassy spared.
On the other hand, an excellent example of JIPB sharing along the entire spectrum who passed it on to SOE agents, who flew it out by small planes at night or radioed it to a
Lysander reconnaissance aircraft flying overhead at night), 25 was the source and method.
In the end, the OVERLORD planners and the leadership of those tasked with securing the bridge (the British 6 th Airborne Division) did not need nor care to know the exact source and method of collection, only the intelligence product and information.
Separating the source and method from the ISR product allows the needed elements of the JIPB to be passed to a wider variety of coalition partners, without having to develop STANAGs or vetting their personnel through NDP 1. Current joint doctrine offers no clear answer for how to do that.
One answer would be to develop intelligence information-sharing systems using commercial off-the-shelf software and hardware systems to categorize, view, and disseminate uniquely national JIPB information to all coalition partners involved in decision-making. The United States could supply the end-to-end system to the coalition partners, and ensure that those systems were unable to link or transfer to other types of sys-tems. Once JIPB information was gathered, it would pass through that nation's intelligence officers. The country providing the information would give it a "source reliability rating" from 1 to 5, supported by commercially available imagery if necessary. Source ratings would be based on the proven accuracy of the ISR systems obtaining the information. From there, that particular bit of intelligence information would enter the funnel where the joint intelligence fusion cell would give it a final "INT" score based on the proven track record for that particular coalition member's intelligence. The source and method would never need to be exposed, only the intelligence information. From the joint intelligence fusion cell, it would then be loaded into the coalition's commercial system for dissemination to respective coalition decision-makers.
The final information would arrive at the coalition decision-makers' staffs, devoid of ways and means. Such a technique would allow a wider variety of ISR products to be available for deciding the conduct of a campaign. But the technique alone is only part of the equation, for the human must be in the loop, and the joint force officer who processes and analyzes the information must be able to appreciate it from the perspective of coalition allies, and with an understanding of asymmetric enemies.
Western bias in warfare must change. It is binary. It is neat. It adds up and fits in a digital world. It assumes two sides, one friendly and one enemy. There needs to be a cognitive framework to prepare for operating on a battlefield that is anything but binary.
Nowhere does the United States have language to allow it to frame CCIR for parties other than the enemy and itself. Nor does it have a way to think about the enemy from the point of view of others with whom it may be temporarily allied. Who did the IPB for the commander of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, and who is doing it now for the nas-cent Iraqi security forces? No one is, and there is no vocabulary for them to use if they were appointed. It has long been assumed that the battlefield affected everyone the same way, but if U.S. forces are fighting an asymmetric threat, that is no longer true.
The joint doctrine for IPB is schizophrenic when it comes to the inclusion of coalition partners. In addition to the previously explored weaknesses of sharing JIPB products and ISR collection with coalition partners, they are excluded from the JIPB development process and their IPB requirements are not viewed as core elements for planning. Obviously, this refers to the standing agreements and procedures of Cold War alliances, but is of little value for the ad hoc "coalitions of the willing" that U.S. forces will be using for most operations in the future. With the exception of highlighting the need to coordinate with coalition forces for HUMINT operations in a MOOTW setting, the need for the IPB to address coalition requirements and participation in the JIPB process is absent from the JTTP for JIPB. 27 Joint Pub 2-0 has buried multinational issues in an annex that does not discuss the coalition commander's need to understand how the battlespace and the enemy affect the coalition partners. 28 To The IPB process gives the planners their understanding of both the battlespace and the adversary. The compartmented "behind the green door" intelligence culture creates seams between the J-2 and the J-5, but is most noticeable in the way it works to find the holes in U.S. doctrine to make it too hard for coalition partners to participate in the IPB process. Thus, U.S. forces accept voids of knowledge and analysis in their planning, while at the same time claiming information dominance.
As previously discussed, the United States as a nation, and its military in particular, is not very good at understanding its adversaries' cultures and ways of thinking. That presents both a major challenge and an opportunity for intelligence planning that current doctrine all but excludes. The challenge is to ensure that both the United States and its allies share a common understanding of the JIPB. The opportunity is to gain from coalition partners a better understanding of how adversaries might think. In the war against an asymmetric threat U.S. forces tend to underestimate what less technologically proficient partners might provide.
Clearly the United States is in the unique historical position of being able to fight any adversary, anywhere in the world, and dominate the combat arena. However, at the very least the nation needs coalition partners for access and post-conflict assistance for security and reconstruction. The more effective the international participation, the greater the international legitimacy, and the better will be the chance of winning the hearts and minds of the local population as well as that of the U.S. taxpayer and soldier.
If coalition partners participate in IPB activities, they are more likely to understand their role in operations, their security requirements, their contribution to civil affairs efforts, their transportation requirements, and their logistic requirements, which also makes it easier for them to participate.
There is no doubt that most coalition partners will need some level of U.S. assistance to succeed. The Polish-led multinational division currently deploying to Iraq will be an interesting case study in how to integrate a coalition force. It will arrive almost six months into phase four, the post-conflict stage. Because of the late start, it may not have a complete understanding of the Iraqi citizens' "history of the conflict," nor might it understand the rationale for previous U.S. military actions in its sector and the complete security requirements. Is the United States sharing the initial IPB? Is it working with them to rebuild the IPB to include the impact and requirements for all 20-plus participating nations? If that foundational synchronization is not completed, it is very likely that the Polish division will unintentionally work at cross-purposes to the CPA's security, civil affairs, and information objectives. Drawing a conclusion from it all, it is not the intent here to merely poke at gaps in the current intelligence system, but rather to suggest a series of potential vectors out from those holes. In that vein, the way out must start on a number of fronts, each with different levels of effort and points of maturity.
The first vector out is to improve U.S. understanding of the enemy-exactly who they are and what makes them tick. At stake is the nation's ability to wage war against its current enemies, within the context of a coalition of the willing. That is essentially a culture shift. The United States must make a serious effort to put the human, and human values, back in the loop. It should dramatically upgrade the professional development of its joint HUMINT officers, thus expanding their reach and capabilities; and it must develop a professional corps of officers, with consistent credentials across the Services, from which to draw U.S. attaches. The nation can significantly improve the sensitivity of its line officers by placing the same weight on undergraduate studies in language and culture at U.S. academies and ROTC as it does on engineering and science. It must then emphasize cross-cultural challenges in Service schools. The nation must capture the language competence of all its officers and enlisted personnel, not just those in languagerelated specialties; and it must employ its concerns for diversity to do a better job of recruiting among first-generation immigrant populations. The United States also must revise its doctrine for JIPB, emphasizing that the analysis is no longer bipolar-it is no longer just "us" and "them-and most of "them" do not think like Americans do.
Another long-term vector out involves reinvigorating the weight of effort given to the HUMINT side of intelligence gathering. Policy makers need to understand HUMINT to collect the right types of HUMINT. The DOD needs to seek increased funding from
Congress for HUMINT recruitment, manning, training, and operations, thus enabling more HUMINT for everything from tagging information to clandestine operations. In addition, statutory relief is needed from the constraints that have held back HUMINT collectors from doing their jobs.
A more short-term and immediate fix is to enable IPB for coalition operations by adjusting U.S. joint intelligence TTP. The United States needs to introduce a common computer system for coalition partners to use in intelligence dissemination; using standalone, commercial, off-the-shelf software and hardware systems that are easily compatible with one another. Joint operations must also separate intelligence products and information from sources and methods. That can be done by using a simple metric score attached to the information, which will allow immediate intelligence sharing in the joint intelligence fusion cell, and allow that same information to be passed to the coalition decision-makers. If the United States is to win the asymmetric battles of the future, it must fully embrace the squishy, nontechnical, analytical, cultural, and human dimensions of both its own and its coalition partners' intelligence efforts. It is not the latest technological device, but the ingenuity and efforts of the people in the battlespace that win the war. The
United States should properly prepare and equip its forces to win in the asymmetric battlespace.
